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Beyond Dusky and Godinez:
Competency Before and After
Trial
Michael L. Perlin, J.D.*
Scholars have carefully considered all aspects of the in-
competency to stand trial process, questions involving
incompetency to confess, questions involving incompe-
tency to be executed, and, to a lesser extent, questions
related to incompetency to plead guilty or to waive counsel,
but little attention has been paid to the relationship
between incompetency and the full range of other crimi-
nal procedure issues: sentencing, appeals, consent to
searches, and others. This article discusses this range of
issues, assesses the factors relied upon by courts in decid-
ing these cases and attempts to offer an agenda for future
scholarly developments in this area. Copyright c 2003
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Even though the insanity defense is the media darling, the lightning rod of media ire,
and topic of obsessive public preoccupation,1 researchers, scholars and practicing
lawyers all agree that questions of criminal competency are, numerically, at least, far
more important to the administration of criminal justice. 2 For a variety of reasons-
the fact that incompetency determinations are usually done quietly and with
little fanfare, the fact that incompetency defendants are usually significantly more
disabled than insanity defendants and are thus less likely to have committed the kind
of high-visibility crimes that make tabloid headlines, the fact that there is rarely
any testimony about the actual crime at the incompetency hearing,3 the fact that the
raising of the incompetency status is in no way a concession of having committed
*Correspondence to: Michael L. Perlin, J.D., Professor of Law, New York Law School, 57 Worth Street,
New York, NY 10013, U.S.A. E-mail: mperlinTnyls.edu
'See, e.g., ALAN STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 41 (1975) ("The
insanity defense is a pimple on the nose of justice but the patient is dying of congestive heart
failure").2 On the frequency of competency evaluations, see, e.g., GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUA-
TIONS FOR THE COURTS § 6.05(a), at 135 136 (2nd ed. 1999) (evaluations have "increased significantly"
since 1978, when they numbered 20,000); compare 4 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW:
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 9C-3.1, at 331 n.37 (2nd ed. 2002) (in New Jersey in 1982, insanity pleas entered
in 50 of 32,500 felony cases).3See 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 8A-3.2, at 38 39.
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the underlying criminal act 4 -competency questions have never registered on
our various radar screens with the same urgency and immediacy as have
insanity defense questions. And this notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court has considered aspects of this question at least six times in the past
three decades.5
This is important for two reasons: to reinforce the reality that criminal incompe-
tency is a severely underconsidered issue (and this is territory that has been covered
previously, 6 and needs no further elaboration here), and that even discussions about
"criminal incompetency" often ignore many of the critical competency questions
that arise regularly-and with little fanfare-before the courts.7 And that is the
subject of this article.
Self-evidently, the greatest focus is on, and will always be on, the seminal issue of
incompetency to stand trial (1ST): the substantive standards, 8 the procedural
contours of the 1ST hearing, 9 the means by which the state can treat the defendant
so as to "make him" competent,10 and the procedures by which defendants found
1ST are institutionalized and released.1 1 Each of these has been the topic of
Supreme Court attention and extensive scholarly commentary,12 and the question
of restoration to competency (or "creation" of competency) by means of the
involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications continues to be one of
4 See Michael L. Perlin, "For the Misdemeanor Outlaw": The Impact of the ADA on the Institutionalization of
Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193, 206 207 (2000) ("Also disturbing is
the often unstated but lingering assumption that any defendant on whose 'behalf the incompetency status
is raised is, in fact, "factually guilty" of the underlying crime. When I was a public defender, I represented
in individual cases well over 200 criminal defendants who had been found at some point incompetent
to stand trial. In not a single case did the prosecutor, the judge, or the forensic evaluator even acknowledge
the possibility that the defendant might have been 'factually innocent' of the underlying charge").
5See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (Due process applies to post-incompetency
commitment process); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992) (placing burden of proof on defendant
at commitment hearing not unconstitutional); Cooperv. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) (placing burden
of proof on defendant at commitment hearing by quantum of clear and convincing evidence unconstitu-
tional); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (Absent police coercion, mental disability alone will not
invalidate confession); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (unconstitutional to execute a currently
incompetent defendant); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (unitary standard to be used in
competency to stand trial, waive counsel, and plead guilty cases).6See, generally, Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 625, 669 670 (1993); Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 940 (1985).7There has been virtually no attention paid to another important issue: the extent to which the specific
inquiry mandated by Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (whether a defendant "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and
whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him"), must be
modified in determining competency in other contexts. This will be explored separately in a subsequent
article.
"See Dusky, supra.
9See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966); Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Medina, supra;
Cooper, supra.
'
0 Compare, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F. 2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), with United Statesv. Charters, 863
F. 2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. den., 494 U.S. 1016 (1990).
11Jackson, supra.
12See, e.g., 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 8A-2 to 8A-5.6b, at 2 83.
There has also been extensive behavioral commentary on competency standards and on the substance
of competency evaluations See id., § 8A-2.2 at 10 12 n. 56 (citing sources).
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the "hottest" and most contentious issues in all mental disability law, and one on
which the Supreme Court has just granted certiorari.13
But, again, these are not the only criminal competency issues to which attention
has been paid. The Supreme Court has considered, variously, (i) the relationship
between mental disability and the validity of a confession, 14 (ii) the competency
standards to be employed when a criminal defendant wishes to waive counsel or
plead guilty, 15 and (iii) the constitutionality of executing a once-competent-to-be-
tried-but-now-incompetent criminal defendant, 16 and each of these areas has
spawned a generation of interpretive caselaw and critical literature.
17
This is not to say that this entire area of the law is facially incoherent.1 8 Certainly,
the Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran, holding that a unitary compe-
tency standard applies to questions of competency to stand trial, competency to
plead guilty, and competency to waive counsel 19 appeared to bring a measure of
coherence -albeit misguided coherence 20 to this entire enterprise.
Yet, this is only one very small piece of the story. There are many other questions
of "criminal competency" that have been the topic of dozens of court decisions, yet
are nearly totally bereft of scholarly or clinical- or practitioner-based analysis. 2 1 Nor
does it appear that they lend themselves to any overarching theoretical construct.
This article will identify and categorize these decisions, discussing briefly the current
caselaw, and speculating as to why so little attention has been paid (and why that
lack of attention is seriously problematic).
Importantly, Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Godinez focuses on one of the
issues considered in this article: the impact of Godinez's unitary standard on
cases involving other aspects of the criminal competency inquiry. Writing for
himself and for Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy asserted "The Due Process Clause
does not mandate different standards of competency at various stages of or for
different decisions made during the criminal proceedings.' 2 2 Although he did not
further define "criminal proceedings," this immediately followed his interpreta-
tion of the universality of the Dusky standard in "other" competency cases: "That
13See United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (government could, subject to limitations,
forcibly administer antipsychotic medication for the sole purpose of rendering pre-trial detainee
competent to stand trial, where its interest in restoring defendant's competency so he could be brought
to trial was paramount and no less intrusive means of restoring defendant's competency were available),
cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 512 (2002).
14Connelly, supra.
15Godinez, supra.
16Ford, supra. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
17See, e.g., 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, §§ 8B-2 to 8B-3.1c, §§ 10-3.3 to 10-3.3d, §§ 12-4.1 to 12-4.2, at 101
117, 406 421, and 519 550.
'On the incoherence of insanity defense jurisprudence see, inter alia, Perlin, supra note 4, at 208, Michael
L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You from Me": The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the
Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1424 (1997), and Michael L. Perlin,
Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
599, 601 (1989 90).
19 Godinez, 509 U.S., at 390.20 See Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. Moran, Colin Ferguson, and the Trial of
Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendants, 14 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 61, 78 (1996) ("The Court's holding in
Godinez reflected at its base its profound disinterest in (and perhaps, cynicism about) the integrity of the
criminal trial process"), and id. at 81 ("Godinez is, at base, a cynical and meretricious decision").2 1This, of course, excludes the question of competence to be executed, a topic with a rich literature. See,
e.g., 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 12-4.1d at 539 n.431 (citing articles).22 Godinez, 509 U.S. at 404 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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If the topics already discussed are to be excluded, the remaining areas of criminal
competency (in which there has been some case law developed) can be divided into
these groupings: pre-trial process issues, trial process issues, post-trial process issues,
and others. It must be kept in mind that each of the pre-trial process issues precedes the
"time of arraignment" referred to by Justice Kennedy in his Godinez concurrence, and
25
each of the post-trial process issues follows the "time of verdict" in the same opinion.
Pre-Trial Process Issues
Confession Law
There is a robust body of caselaw dealing with confession questions. Since 1960, it
has appeared clear that a confession is inadmissible if the defendant was mentally
incompetent at the time it was given.26 Since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda v. Arizona,2 7 the prosecution has been prohibited from using any custodial
statements unless the defendant has waived his right to silence by a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent waiver.2 8 Whether a waiver is knowingly and intelligently
made depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused; 29 the state must bear the
burden of proving that the waiver was so knowingly and intelligently made.30
Courts must employ "special care" in the evaluation of confessions of individuals
with mental disabilities, 31 and, while mental deficiency "of itself' 32 does not render
a confession involuntary, it is a "relevant factor ' 33 that must be considered in
the "totality of circumstances.", 34 Neither subnormal intelligence, 35 "lack of
education and illiteracy, ' 36 nor "previous incidents of mental instability, 37 are
231d., at 403.24This section is largely adopted from 4 PERLIN, supra, note 2, §§ 8B-3.2 to 8B-3.5, at 117 128.2 5Godinez, 509 U.S., at 403.2 6See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). Such a confession is proscribed as not being the
product of "a rational intellect and free will." Id., at 208. See, e.g., Kimbell v. State, 252 Ga. 65, 311
S.E.2d 465 (1984).
But see Connelly, supra (coercive police activity a necessary predicate to finding of involuntariness of
confession, even in the case of defendant with mental disabilities).
27384 U.S. 436 (1966).
28Id., at 444.29Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Cf Connelly, supra.3 0Miranda, 384 U.S., at 436.3 1See, e.g., People v. Simmons, 326 N.E.2d 383 (III. 1975); People v. Turner, 306 N.E.2d 27 (III. 1973).32People v. Redmon, 468 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (III. App. 1984) (quoting Turner, 306 N.E.2d, at 30).3 3See State v. Smith, 370 N.W.2d 827, 830 (Wis. 1985).34Redmon, 468 N.E.2d at 1315 (quoting Turner, 306 N.E.2d at 30). Cf. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169 170
(notions of "free will" have no place in Constitutional analysis of confession's admissibility).3 5See State v. Jenkins, 268 S.E.2d 458 (N.C. 1980).3 6State v. Osborne, 330 S.E.2d 447, 448 (Ga. App. 1985).37 See State v. Vickers, 291 S.E.2d 599 (N.C. 1982).
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"necessarily dispositive" of the issue of mental competence at the time the
38
confession is given .
Generally, a statement has been found to be inadmissible where "the mental
subnormality [sic] is so great that an accused is incapable of understanding the
meaning and effect of his confessions, ,39 or where defendant's mental illness is
combined with other circumstances so that it is not the "product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by the maker.
' 40
However, this is "old news." Other important pre-trial questions have been the
subject of virtually no scholarly attention: matters involving searches and seizures,
lineups, and preliminary hearings. Generally, with respect to these and other pre-
trial process rights, courts have declined to establish a separate standard for
determining the competency of a criminal defendant to participate at a suppression
hearing, generally ruling that the "bona fide doubt" procedural standard of Pate v.
Robinson is similarly applicable.
4 1
Search and Seizure
At least two cases have explored the relationship between competency to consent
and a subsequent police search and seizure.4 2 In one, a federal district court ruled
that mental competency is relevant to any inquiry in determining voluntariness of a
consent.4 3 In the other, the Fourth Circuit rejected a defendant's similar argument,
on the basis that the defendant cited "no authority for the proposition that such
incompetency renders consent to the search invalid."4 4 Also, a New York trial court
has ruled that defense counsel was not entitled to waive an incompetent defendant's
right to be present at a suppression hearing.45 Note, however, that all of these cases
were decided prior to Godinez.
3 8Statev. Simpson, 334 S.E.2d 53, 59 (N.C. 1985). Cf. Statev. Sergent, 621 P.2d 209, 211 212 (Wash.
App. 1980) ("The combination of the defendant's incompetency, his mental illness, the medication he
was taking, and his adverse reactions to those drugs, his attempt at plea bargaining and his waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights without the assistance of his attorney, compel us to find that his
statement to [the police officer] was involuntary").39 Casias v. State, 452 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).4 0jackson v. United States, 404 A.2d 911, 923 (D.C. App. 1979) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568, 602 (1961)).4 1United States ex rel. Phillips v. Lane, 580 F. Supp. 839, 843 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (citing cases). See also People v.
Vallen, 488 N.Y.S.2d 994, 997 (Sup. Ct. 1985) ("The criminal process does not proceed in... piecemeal
and independent stages, but.., all stages of a criminal proceeding are interdependent and intertwined").42 On a defendant's competency to consent to a police search, see James Wulach, Psychological Evaluation
of the Consent to Search, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 319 (1990).
On the role of consent in the area of search and seizure law in this context generally, see Russell
Galloway, Basic FourthAmendmentAnalysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 737, 760 761 (1992), citing in part
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973):
Searches are permitted without probable cause or particularized justification if based on voluntary
consent of a person with authority over the place searched or a person whom the police reasonably
believe possesses such authority. To determine whether consent is voluntary, the Court uses a
"totality of the circumstances" test focusing on such factors as the competence and mental
condition of the person who consented, whether she knew of the right to refuse, whether she
cooperated or resisted, whether she was in custody when she consented, and whether the police
made a "claim of authority" to search or engaged in other coercive conduct.
43 United States v. Ocampo, 492 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).44 United States v. Flannery, 879 F.2d 863 1989 WL 79731, *4 (4th Cir. 1989).45 See People v. Matthews, 585 N.Y.S.2d 948 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
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Lineups
One case has held that an incompetent criminal suspect could be required to
participate in a pre-arraignment lineup.4 6 The court in this case cited Justice
Kennedy's Godinez concurrence and concluded that it was "unclear" whether the
Dusky standard applied to pre-arraignment matters.47
Preliminary Hearing
One case has held that if an information 48 is dismissed due to defendant's incompe-
tence at the preliminary hearing stage, the defendant is entitled to another prelimi-
nary hearing once competence is restored. 49 Godinez was not cited in this case.
Trial Process Issues
Other cases have considered the relationship between a defendant's competency
and such issues as jury waiver, evidentiary objections, and statements to the media.
Yet others have considered the implications of juror incompetency and witness
incompetency.50
In a related context, other courts have considered the interplay between incom-
petency and the entry of pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity and pleas of guilty
but mentally ill.
Jury Waivers
Courts have split on jury waiver questions. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that a waiver
should not have been accepted without further inquiry as to defendant's mental state,
5 1
noting that the defendant "must be competent to waive the jury right, and the waiver
must in fact be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." 52 According to the Ninth Circuit,
this requirement of Godinez spoke to more than simply a competency determination:
Whereas competency goes to a defendant's capacity in general, "[t]he purpose of the
'knowing and voluntary' inquiry, by contrast, is to determine whether the defendant
actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision."
The Court has called this inquiry a "serious and weighty responsibility." Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465... (1938). We now hold that district courts may not
discharge this responsibility in cases where they have reason to suspect a defendant
may suffer from mental or emotional instability without an in-depth colloquy which
reasonably assures the court that under the particular facts of the case, the signed waiver
was voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made.5 3
On the other hand, another court has ruled that a defendant's due process rights
were not violated when jury selection proceeded while defendant was undergoing
psychological evaluation for purposes of determining competency to stand trial, a
4 6See Matter of Harris, 627 N.Y.S. 2d 207 (Sup. Ct. 1995), and see id. at 209 211 (explaining the
significance of this inquiry).
471d., at 209.4 8Califomia has long proceeded in criminal cases by the use of an "information" rather than an
indictment. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).49 People v. Duncan, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 173 (App. 2000), reh'g denied (2000).
5 0 0f course, Godinez is not facially relevant to either of these issues.
5 1United States v. Christensen, 18 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 1994).
521d., at 824, citing Godinez, 509 U.S., at 399 400.
531d., at 826, also citing Godinez, 509 U.S., at 401 n.12.
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case in which no finding of incompetency had ever been made.54 In addition, one
pre-Godinez court has required a separate finding that a defendant-found to be
competent to stand trial-was also competent to waive a jury trial. 5
Evidentiary Objections
On the question of the impact of a defendant's incompetence on the admissibility
into evidence of several letters he wrote at the time he had been found incompetent
to stand trial, a Virginia appellate court has ruled that such incompetence did not
preclude admission into evidence.5 6 Another court has ruled, contrarily, that it was
reversible error to use the deposition testimony of the victim in a criminal case that
was taken at the time when the defendant was incompetent.57
Statements to the Media
Yet another court has concluded that finding defendant incompetent to stand trial
compelled the conclusion that he was also incompetent to waive other rights relating to
the prosecution (in this case, speaking publicly to the media about the alleged crime).
Competency of Jurors59
At least one court has ruled that there was no error requiring reversal of a conviction
where a juror related his "reactive psychosis" experience to other jurors. 6 0 Here, the
court reasoned:
While jurors may not receive information from an outside source nor act as expert
witnesses in the jury room, they are entitled to rely on and to relate their own common
sense and life experiences during deliberations. Here the record reveals only the
statement quoted above without any indication that the jury was improperly pressured
to apply this juror's personal experience to the case at hand.61
Competency of Witness to Testify62
Many cases have considered the procedures to be employed in determining whether
a witness is competent to testify. The lead case of Sinclair v. Wainwright63 set out the
controlling legal standards:
54Brown v. Doe, 803 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff'd, 2 F.3d 1236 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 1125 (1994).
5 5State v. Cameron, 704 P.2d 1355 (Ariz. 1985); see also Coronado v. Lefevre, 748 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (same standard to determine competency to waive jury trial as competency to stand trial); compare
Harringer v. State, 566 So. 2d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (no evidence presented that defendant was
competent to waive jury trial).5 6See Jones v. Commonwealth, 526 S.E.2d 281 (Va. App. 2000).57 Williams v. State, 685 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. App. 1997).
5 8Mann v. State's Attorney for Montgomery County, 468 A.2d 124, 129 (Md. 1983).
59Although this and the following subsection (competence of a witness to testify) raise different issues
than the questions posed in the remainder of this article, they are included here because the overarching
questions of competency are frequently assessed by courts in the same ways.6 0See State v. Lindeken, 799 P.2d 23 (Ariz. App.), review denied (1990).
611d., at 406 (defendant convicted of manslaughter; insanity defense rejected).6 2 See supra note 59.
63814 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1987).
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Turning then to the merits of appellant's due process claim, it may be noted "that a
[person with mental disability] may be allowed to testify if he is able to [comprehend]
the obligation of an oath and give a correct account of matters he has seen or heard... "
(Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 (fifth Cir.1974)). But if a patient in a mental
institution is offered as a witness, an opposing party may challenge competency,
whereupon it becomes the duty of the court to make such an examination as will
satisfy the court of the competency of the proposed witness. (Id. at 1223 24). And if the
challenged testimony is crucial, critical or highly significant, failure to conduct an
appropriate competency hearing implicates due process concerns of fundamental
fairness [citation omitted].
This is not to say "that every allusion as to incompetency of a witness [is to] be
exhaustively explored by the trial judge, particularly where all other evidence sub-
stantiates competency." United States v. Crosby, 462 F.2d 1201, 1203 n. 5 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). But in the present situation, as in Crosby, id. at 1203, we believe a "red flag"
of material impact on competency was flying. [The potential witness] was offered as an
eyewitness to many of the critical aspects of the state's case against Sinclair. He had
been declared incompetent to stand trial by the judge who was trying Sinclair. Only by a
reasonable exploration of all the facts and circumstances could the trial judge exercise
sound discretion concerning the competency of the witness and the findings of the court
with respect to competency should have been made to appear on the record. The record
reflects no searching exploration and no stated reasons for overruling appellant's
competency objections.
In such circumstances, we are obliged to remand for a determination on the record of
the competency of the witness... 64
At least one of Sinclair's assertions-its reliance on Shuler for the proposition that
"If a patient in a mental institution is offered as a witness, an opposing party may
641d., at 1522 1523.
For earlier case law, see Shuler v. Wainwright, 491 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1974); Hills v. Henderson, 529
F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 850 (1976); United States v. Crosby, 462 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
For later cases, see, e.g., Hughes v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1203 (Ind. 1989); Ambles v. State, 383 S.E.2d 555
(Ga. 1989); Commonwealth v. Fayerweather, 546 N.E.2d 345 (Mass. 1989); State v. Dumaine, 783 P.2d
1184 (Ariz. 1989); Gilpin v. McCormick, 921 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1990); Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222
(7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1042 (1990); Statev. Olivo, 589 A.2d 597 (N.J. 1991); United States
v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1991); State in Interest ofB.G., 589 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1991); People
v. Rainge, 570 N.E.2d 431, reh'h denied (III. App. 1991); Simmons v. State, 683 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. Dist.
App. 1996), reh'g denied (1997); State v. Blasius, 559 A.2d 1116 (Conn. 1989); State v. Danforth, 573
N.W.2d 369 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (1998), appeal after remand, 1999 WL 262143 (1999);
Gilstrap v. State, 945 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. App. 1997), petit. for discretionary review denied (1997); State v.
Henries, 704 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1997); Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997);
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 702 N.E.2d 395 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998); State v. Ballos, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Wis.
App. 1999), review denied, 609 N.W.2d 473 (Wis. 2000); State v. Dillon, 1999 WL 148370 (Ohio App.
1999); State v. Washington, 506 S.E.2d 283 (N.C. App. 1998), review denied (1999), appeal dismissed
(1999); United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997); People v. Stephenson, 555
N.E.2d 802 (III. App. 1990).
On whether the prosecution must disclose the medical record of a government witness, see Drew v.
United States, 46 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995) (failure to disclose was
immaterial; no due process deprivation).
On the question of the state's obligation to turn over witness statements at competency hearings, see
People v. McPhee, 614 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. 1994) (state compelled to turn over statements); State v.
Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117 (Conn. 1996) (trial court properly denied defendant's motion for in camera
inspection of witnesses' psychiatric records); cf State v. Israel, 963 P.2d 897 (Wash. App. 1998), review
denied, 972 P.2d 465 (Wash. 1998) (no compelling reasons to justify psychological examination of alleged
co-conspirator).
See generally Note, The Mentally Deficient Witness: The Death of Incompetency, 14 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
107 (1990).
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challenge competency, whereupon it becomes the duty of the court to make such
an examination as will satisfy the court of the competency of the proposed
witness 65_is seriously flawed. As a matter of law, incompetency cannot be
presumed as a result of either mental illness or institutionalization.66 Furthermore,
there is "no necessary relationship between mental illness and incompetency which
renders [mentally ill persons] unable to provide informed consent to medical
treatment.",67 Yet, it is clear that courts will continue to, sub silentio, follow this
doctrine, especially in criminal cases.
Impact of Incompetency Finding on Ability to Enter Insanity Plea68
Several cases have considered the significance of an incompetency finding on a
defendant's ability to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, holding that due
process prohibits any determination of sanity until such time as the defendant is
restored to competency. 69 Another case has held that a statute permitting an
incompetent defendant to offer a defense on the merits, but not one based on mental
illness, did not violate the defendant's equal protection rights. 70 As an incompetent
defendant is definitionally unable to participate in his defense, it could not be
assured that any adjudication resulting from an insanity trial would "represent a fair
and just determination of the mental element of the offense placed in issue by the
insanity plea.",
7 1
On the other hand, the fact that a defendant had previously been found to be
insane does not render him subsequently incompetent to proceed to trial per se on
another charge.72 Yet another case has found that a defendant who elects to
represent himself at trial can also waive pleading the insanity defense. 73 Interest-
ingly, in this case, the Utah Supreme Court used Godinez to find for the defendant:
6 5Sinclair, 514 F.2d, at 1522, quoting Shuler, 491 F.2d, at 1223 1224.6 61n re Labelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986).67 Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Michael L. Perlin, Competency,
Deinstitutionalization and Homelessness: A Story of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. REv. 63, 113 114
(1991); Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection,
28 Hous. L. REV. 15 (1991).6 8For a clinical perspective, see William Johnson et al., The Relationship of Competency to Stand Trial and
Criminal Responsibility, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 169 (1990).69 See Coolbroth v. District Ct. of l7th Judicial Dist., 766 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1988); United States v. Evans, 704
F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Pa. 1989); see also State v. Werner, 796 P.2d 610 (N.M. 1990), cert. den. (1990).
Compare People v. Angeletakis, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, review denied (Cal. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
926 (1993) (affirming denial of motion of insanity acquittee for proceedings to consider his competency to
stand trial on the question of an extension of his post-insanity acquittal commitment). Coolbroth is
discussed in this context in Justine Dunlap, What's Competence Got to Do With It: The Right Not to Be
Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 495, 506 n.89 (1997).7 0Spero v. Commonwealth, 678 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1997).7 1Coolbroth, 766 P.2d at 673. See also Evans, 704 F. Supp. at 84 ("futile" to attempt to conduct
meaningful insanity evaluation as long as defendant remains "overtly psychotic"). See generally R.J.
Mackay & Gerry Kearns, The Trial of the Facts and Unfitness to Plead, 1997 CRIM. L. REV. 644.72people v. Blehm, 791 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 817 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).7 3State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665 (Utah 1997). On a defendant's right to not plead insanity, see 4 PERLIN,
supra note 2, § 9A-8, at 241 245.
Compare State v. Martinez, 651 A.2d 1189 (R.I. 1994) (Standards for competency to stand trial and
competency to testify as witness are distinct from standard for criminal responsibility).
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Therefore, Woodland should not be required to display a heightened level of compe-
tency to waive his right to a particular defense. See Godinez... (holding that competency
standard for standing trial is same as standard for determining competency to waive
right to counsel). The trial court correctly concluded that Woodland knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to assert a mental illness defense.7 4
Impact of Incompetency Finding on Ability to Enter
Guilty but Mentally Ill Plea
At least one case has held that a guilty but mentally ill conviction 75 would be
invalid where the defendant's competence had not been re-evaluated before
trial.76
Post-trial Process Issues
Cases have considered the impact of competency on virtually every post-trial stage,
including motions for new trials, sentencing, probation hearings, parole revocation
hearings, conditional release hearings, participation in post-conviction relief pro-
ceedings, and appeals.7 7 Again, the application of the Godinez unitary standard to
post-conviction proceedings has never been considered by the Supreme Court.7 8
This gap has been considered in Coe v. Bell, a Sixth Circuit death penalty case, in
which the defendant argued that the common law standard governing the modem
standard for competency to stand trial also applied to a competency-to-be-executed
proceeding, citing to Godinez.79 The Sixth Circuit responded by citing to the
language in Justice Kennedy's concurrence already discussed, adding:
It appears from his opinion, however, that Justice Kennedy was concerned that the
same standard be applied from the time of a defendant's arraignment through his
sentencing. ... Because competency to be executed involves different interests than
competency to stand trial in the first instance, we do not believe that a state rigidly must
apply the competency-to-stand-trial standard in this context where it does not make
sense in modern practice.8 0
New Trials
At least one case has held that a defendant has a right to be competent at a motion
for a new trial. 81
74 Woodland, 945 P.2d at 670 671.7 5See 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 9A-3.7, at 169 179.7 6See People v. Harris, 460 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. App. 1990).77The discussion in this section omits consideration of these collateral issues in the death penalty context.
See 4 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 8B-3.4g, at 127, for a specific study of these issues.7
"Also, to the best of my knowledge, an issue discussed by the Supreme Court in Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162 (1975), has never been considered in this context: can the question of competency here be raised
by the prosecutor or the judge, or simply by defense counsel? See Perlin, supra note 4, at 198 n.33
(discussing Drope in this context).
79209 F.3d 815, 826 (6th Cir. 2000), rehearing den. (6th Cir. 2000), cert. den., 529 U.S. 1084 (2000).
sold.
See Williams v. Turpin, 87 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 1996). Interestingly, neither Dusky nor Drope nor
Godinez was cited in this case.
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Sentencing
It is black letter law that a court may not sentence an incompetent defendant. 82 In
the case of a defendant who becomes incompetent between the time of the guilty
verdict and the time of sentence, most state statutes provide for the same test to be
employed as is used when determining a defendant's competency to stand trial,
83
with "the emphasis on the defendant's capacity to tell his attorney about factors that
would mitigate his sentence or would refute aggravating circumstances brought up
by the prosecution, as well as on his understanding of the punishment.", 84 Also, at
least one court has held that a psychiatric competency evaluation cannot be ordered
after a defendant is sentenced.85
Probation Hearings
Some attention is now being paid to the relationship between competency and
probation revocation matters. 86 If a reasonable doubt arises as to a defendant's
82 See Bruce J. Winick & Terry L. DeMeo, Competency to Stand Trialin Florida, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 31, 72
(1980). and cases cited at id. n.242.
See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 949 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Phelps, 600 N.E.2d 329 (Ohio
App. 199 1),jurisdictional motion overruled, 583 N.E.2d 971 (Ohio 1992); Stoverv. State, 621 N.E.2d (Ind.
App. 1993); Callowayv. State, 651 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. App. 1995); compare People v. Hall, 541 N.E.2d
1369, 1375 1376 (III. App. 1989) (defendant's "cognitive difficulties" did not raise bona fide doubt of
fitness so as to entitle him to presentencing fitness examination); People v. Sanchez, 662 N.E.2d 1199 (III.
1996), reh'g denied (1996), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1996) (no error where trial judge failed to conduct
fitness hearing prior to sentencing hearing); State v. Lott, 671 So. 2d 1182 (La. App. 1996) (defendant
competent at time of sentencing); see also Gilbert v. State, 951 P.2d 98 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), reh'g
denied (1998), post-conviction relief denied, 955 P.2d 727 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 890
(1998); People v. Dewer, 663 N.Y.S.2d 425 (A.D. 1997), appeal denied, 670 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1998); People
v. Walker, 685 N.E.2d 997 (III. App. 1997); United States v. Hinton, 218 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 2000); People
v. Kilgore, 992 P.2d 661 (Colo. App. 1999), reh'g denied (1999), cert. denied (2000); State v. Tilden, 988
S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App. 1999); Reed v. Texas, 14 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App. 2000), petit. for discretionary
review refused (2001); State v. Fish, 759 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 2000); Woods v. State, 994 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.
App. 1999); United States v. Gigante, 1997 WL 782355 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), supplemented, 996 F. Supp. 194
(E.D.N.Y. 1998) (defendant competent to be sentenced).
United States v. Sanchez, 38 F. Supp. 2d 355, 366 (D.N.J. 1999) has cited Godinez (using a "cf. also"
reference) on the competency-to-be-sentenced question, on the "modest aim" of a competency inquiry:
("seek[ing] to ensure that [the defendant] had the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist
counsel").
On the relationship between a defendant's "episodes" at sentencing and his competency to stand trial,
see Sandham, supra (competency hearing required).8 3See Barbara Weiner, Mental Disability and the Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 693, 705
706 (S.J. Brakel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985). See generally Weissman, Determinative Sentencing andPsychiatric
Evidence: A Due Process Examination, 27 ST. Louis U.L.J. 347 (1983).
"
4Weiner, supra note 83 at 706. See, e.g., Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 972 (1977) (defendant entitled to evidentiary hearing as to competency at time of sentencing as to his
allegations he had attempted to commit suicide on eve of sentencing); Pate v. Commonwealth, 769 S.W.2d 46
(Ky. 1989) (competency hearing not required); United States v. Pellerito, 878 F.2d 1535 (1st Cir. 1989),
appeal after remand sub nom.; United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 862
(1991) (examination required to determine competency at time of sentencing); Statev. Drga, 916 P. 2d 739
(Mont. 1996) (resumption of proceedings following commitment to mental health facility without
determining that defendant had regained his fitness to stand trial invalidated conviction and sentence).
S5State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. 1996), cert. den., 519 U.S. 933 (1996).8 6See State v. Lockwood, 632 A.2d 655 (Vt. 1993) (no competency hearing required prior to commence-
ment of probation revocation hearing); see also Merle v. United States, 683 A.2d 755 (D.C. 1996) (mental
illness not a defense to probation violation); Guzman v. State, 923 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App. 1996)
(defendant competent at time of probation revocation hearing); compare State v. Singleton, 472 S.E.2d 640
(S.C. App. 1996) (Trial court abused its discretion in not ordering competency examination in probation
revocation proceeding).
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competence to participate in a probation hearing,8 7 the court must hold a separate
hearing to determine the defendant's competence to participate.88
Parole Revocation Hearings
Courts are beginning to consider the relationship between competency and parole
revocation hearings; generally, it has been held that the court must hold a separate
hearing to determine the defendant's competence to participate.8 9
Conditional Release Hearings
In cases involving conditional release or community supervision, the court must
hold a separate hearing to determine the defendant's competence to participate. 90
Participation in Post-Conviction Relief Proceedings
Courts have begun to consider the question of a defendant's competency to
participate in post-conviction proceedings, 91 and have generally found that the trial
competency standards apply at this stage. 92 In O'Rourke v. Endell, the court focused
on that aspect of Godinez that discussed the standards for waiver, stressing that the
purpose of the "knowing and voluntary" inquiry "is to determine whether the
defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular
decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.", 93 In Carter v. State, a death
penalty case, the court underscored that competency hearings are required "only
after a capital defendant shows there are specific factual matters at issue that require
the defendant to independently consult with counsel." 94
87 See, e.g., Sailerv. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271,274 (9th Cir. 1977); Soria v. State, 1997 WL 61491 (Tex. App.
1997); State ex rel. Vanderbeke v. Endicott, 563 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. 1997); State ex rel. Juergens v. Cundiff,
939 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1997); Metzgarv. State, 741 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. Dist. App. 1999). Godinez is cited in
none of the post-1993 cases in this cohort.
""See Winick & DeMeo, supra note 82, at 73; compare State v. Qualls, 552 N.E.2d 957 (Ohio App. 1988)
(Issue of competency to participate in probation revocation proceeding may be raised by court or
defendant; decision as to whether to hold competency hearing vested in trial court's sound discretion).
"See Winick & DeMeo, supra note 82, at 73; compare Qualls, supra (Issue of competency to participate in
probation revocation proceeding may be raised by court or defendant; decision as to whether to hold
competency hearing vested in trial court's sound discretion), to People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz, 409
N.Y.S.2d 554 (A.D. 1978) (Absent statutory authority to contrary, interests of fundamental fairness
mandated a consideration of parolee's mental competency during parole revocation process; a determi-
nation of that question, however, is not a condition precedent to parole revocation proceeding, but merely
a factor to be considered in mitigation of, or as an excuse for, charged violations of parole).
9 United States v. Woods, 944 F. Supp. 778 (D. Minn. 1996) (conditional release); Rice v. State, 991
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1999), reh'g overruled (1999), petit. for discretionary review refused (1999)
(community supervision). Godinez is cited in neither case.
9 1See State v. Debra A.E., 523 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1994) (setting out standards to be employed in cases in
which the defendant is unable to assist counsel or to make decisions committed by law to defendant with
reasonable degree of rational understanding).92 Carter v. State, 706 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1997), reh'g denied (1998); Sanchez- Velasco v. State, 702 So. 2d 224
(Fla. 1997); O'Rourke v. Endell, 153 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1998), reh'g & suggestion for reh'g en banc denied
(Sth Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1148 (1999); Matheney v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. 1997), reh'g
denied (1998); People v. Johnson, 730 N.E.2d 1107 (III. 2000); House v. State, 754 So. 2d 1147 (Miss.
1999), reh'g denied (2000); Hundley v. State, 1999 WL 668723 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).9 30'Rourke, 153 F.3d, at 567 568.94 Carter, 706 So. 2d, at 875.
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Appeals
At least one court has held that, if there is a bona fide question as to a defendant's
competence, he does not waive his right to file an appeal. 95 On the other hand, at
least three state supreme courts have held that a defendant's appeal could proceed
even if the defendant had become incompetent, as the appellate record contained
only legal issues, and counsel did not need to rely on the defendant to determine
which issues were worth pursuing.
96
Other Miscellaneous Procedural Matters
Other cases have explored questions of a defendant's competence to be extradited,
97
the impact of a defendant's incompetence on a sexually violent predator act (SVPA)
commitment,98 and the application of Godinez to questions of waiver of counsel in the
involuntary civil commitment hearing of a federal prisoner. 99 In this last setting, the
Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that his commitment to a mental
health facility demonstrated his inability to waive counsel as "unpersuas[ive] ":
Whether an individual possesses sufficient capacity to knowingly waive his right to
counsel is no longer distinct from the question of his competency to stand trial [citing to
Godinez]. The mere fact that Veltman needed "custody for care or treatment in a
suitable facility" does not mean he lacked sufficient capacity to decide to proceed
pro se. ... The purpose of the waiver doctrine "is to determine whether the defendant
actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and
whether the decision [to proceed unassisted] is uncoerced" [citing to Godinez]. After
carefully reviewing the record, we affirm the district court's determination that Veltman
possessed sufficient mental capacity to waive his statutory right to counsel... 1OO
CONCLUSION
The lack of commentary about the cases in this important (yet largely hidden) area
of the law is surprising. The failure of most of the cases to consider carefully the
9 5People v. McKay, 668 N.E.2d 580 (III. App. 1996), appeal denied, 675 N.E.2d 637 (III. 1996). See also
Gentzen v. State, 689 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. App. 1997), reh'g denied (1997) (Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider appeal filed by defendant who had been found to be incompetent to proceed in criminal case).
Compare State v. Currier, 649 A.2d 246 (Vt. 1994) (dismissal of appeal inappropriate where record did not
indicate whether waiver was knowing and intelligent).
9 6People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385, 413 415 (Cal. 1992), reh'g denied (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 881
(1992); State v. Wlhite, 815 P.2d 869, 878 (Ariz. 1991); Dugar v. Wlhitley, 615 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1993).97In re Hinnant, 678 N.E.2d 1314 (Mass. 1997) (Defendant must be competent for rendition of
extradition to proceed), discussed in Eric Loeffler, In re Hinnant: The Relevance of Competence in Interstate
Extradition Proceedings, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 469 (1999); Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121
F.3d 1322 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming denial of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus); Oliver v.
Barrett, 269 Ga. 512, 500 S.E.2d 908 (1998) (extradition proper). See also, e.g., Pruett v. Barry, 696 P.2d
789 (Colo. 1985); Jones v. Warmuth, 272 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1980); People v. Kent, 507 N.Y.S.2d 353
(Sup. Ct. 1986).
9 Commitment of Smith, 600 N.W.2d 258 (Wis. App. 1999) (Defendant has same right to be competent
during SVPA proceedings as in any criminal proceeding); see generally 1 PERLIN, supra note 2, § 2A-3.3, at
75 92.
9 9United States v. Veltman, 9 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1044 (1994); see 1 PERLIN,
supra note 2, § 2C-4.2a, at 317 318.
'°Veltman, 9 F. 3d, at 722.
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relevant precedents (and analogous developments in other jurisdictions) is even
more surprising. And this is, to some extent, curious, given the significance of this
inquiry at every juncture of the criminal process.
There is no question that competency considerations at other stages of pretrial,
trial, and post-trial proceedings will grow in importance in the coming years.
Although Godinez established a unitary test for competency to plead guilty and to
waive counsel, again, collateral competency questions permeate the entire criminal
trial process. It is a matter to which closer attention must be paid.
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